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Why does the propensity for home ownership vary?: 
Focusing on the role of borrowing constraints in Korea 
 
Abstract 
 
The propensity to own (rather than to rent) primary residence tends to vary across geographical areas, over 
time, and among consumer cohorts. This study investigates why that is the case by focusing on the role of 
borrowing constraints in residential mortgage lending in Korea. In particular, a discrete tenure choice model 
is established, based on which effects of both wealth and income constraints as indicated by the maximum 
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and that of debt-to-income (DTI) ratio are estimated. Using the household-level 
micro data from Korea, we report that: the lending restrictions exhibit negative effects on the propensity to 
own, which are also shown to increase for younger borrower cohorts. Despite the fact that the residential 
mortgage lending sector of the country experienced a substantial growth during our study period (2006 to 
2014), the effects of the wealth constraints increased over time, which we interpret as a possible outcome of 
the more binding lending restrictions combined with the location-based regulatory controls. Using the 
empirical findings, we provide a preliminary result of our analysis on the optimal LTV level by age cohort.   
 
Key words: Housing and mortgage demand, tenure choice, and borrowing constraints 
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1. Introduction  
 
The owner occupancy rates (OOR) for primary residence, the share of those households who reside in the 
properties they own, vary widely across time and space: to illustrate, while OORs in the U.S. and UK almost 
reached to almost 70 percent before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), that in Germany has been hovering 
around 40 percent; Korea and Japan are in between with OORs being around 50 percent and 60 percent, 
respectively; and, even in a given country, OORs fluctuate quite widely over time, e.g., OOR in the U.S. 
rising by more than 10 percentage points between 1980 and 2000 from less than 60 percent to 70 percent. 
Academic studies document various market and institutional factors as the underlying determinants to such 
variations, based on both macro-indicators such as home ownership rates (Haurin and Rosenthal (2007), 
Voigtlander (2009), and Andrews and Sanchez (2011)) and micro-indicators of the propensity to own 
(Ohtake and Shintani (1994), Pitkin and Myers (1996), Sinai and Souleles (2008), Lindenthal and Eicholtz 
(2010), and Lee and Kim (2013)).  
 
One particular determinant that has long been receiving a fair amount of attention from academia is the role 
of borrowing constraints (Linneman and Wachter (1989), Linneman et al. (1998), Gyourko et al. (1999), 
Dieleman et al. (2003), Gabriel and Rosenthal (2005), Dawkins (2005), and Boehm and Scholttman (2009)). 
The main hypothesis being exposited by this strand of the literature is that a high likelihood of credit 
rationing, caused by income constraint, by wealth constraint, or by other creditworthiness issues, will reduce 
the propensity to own, ceteris paribus all other conventional determinants such as relative prices of owning 
vs. renting (for residential property of a given set of locational and structural attributes), household income, 
lifecycle and other demographic characteristics. The above studies report the findings that tend to support 
this credit rationing hypothesis – the higher the likelihood of borrowing constrained for a given household in 
terms of loan-to-value (LTV) ratio or debt-to-income (DTI) ratio, the lower the propensity to own given all 
other relevant factors being constant - based on the data from the U.S. or from a small number of European 
countries.           
 
Given this backdrop, this study aims to investigate and document the effects borrowing constraints in an 
emerging market context, with a micro-level household data from Korea and, in so doing, to institute several 
enhancements in performing the empirical analyses: that is, first, a constant-quality housing is assumed, 
based on which relative costs of owning vs. renting are computed; second, differential effects of the 
constraints across different consumer cohorts (i.e., different age and income groups) are estimated to 
elaborate cohort-specific extents of how restrictive those lending restrictions are; and, the interactive effects 
of the wealth constraint (measured via LTV) and of income constraint (via DTI) are examined. Our results 
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show that: the LTV and DTI constraints exhibit negative correlations with the propensity to own, that is, 
ceteris paribus, the more restrictive they are, the lower the likelihood to own; their effects are fairly stable in 
the study area over the period between 2006 and 2014; and, the two constraints are shown to interact each 
other such that the restrictiveness in one constraint influences the effect of the other on the consumer 
decision to own.  
 
Figure 1: The trends in home ownership rates in selected countries 
 
Source: Kim et al. (2013)  
 
Our results that all the usual determinants of the propensity to own show the expected signs with statistically- 
significant coefficients: that is, the higher the permanent income, the larger the family size, the older the age 
cohort, the propensity to own gets higher; on the other hand, the higher the user cost (or relative cost of 
owning), the lower the propensity becomes. However, contrary to our expectation, the two latter year cohorts 
(2010 and 2016) show the lower propensities own, ceteris paribus, compared to the 2006 cohort, even though 
the residential mortgage market in Korea experience a substantial growth during the time period. As a 
possible reason for the last result, we conjecture that the market-wide lending restrictions through LTV-DTI 
caps along with the location-driven regulations might have lowered the propensity for average consumer 
over the same time period.    
 
As expected, the two borrowing constraints tested show binding effects on the propensity to own: that is, 
compared to the unconstrained households, both the moderately- and highly-constrained households exhibit 
the lower propensities, which is similar for both income constraints and the wealth constraints; But, as 
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indicated by the regression coefficients, the magnitudes of the wealth effects are far larger than those of 
income constrains. Furthermore, when interacted with the age cohorts, it is also shown that the wealth 
constraints have a larger impact on the young borrowers. Using our empirical results, we provide a 
preliminary analysis on the optimal LTV level by age-cohort by exploiting the fact that the two constraints 
are correlated through the underlying variables used. 
 
The rest of the paper consists of the following four sections: a critical survey of prior studies (Section 2); the 
empirical analysis (data and variables, testing model, and results); a policy implication as to the optimal LTV 
level; and, concluding remarks.    
 
 
2. Prior Studies: A Critical Review   
 
Theoretical underpinning  
 
In a dynamic sense, household’s tenure decision is made in a highly complex utility maximization 
framework. Following Cho (2017), a representative consumer with perfect foresight maximizes a 
forward-looking expected utility function with two arguments – housing as a durable good, h, and a 
non-durable consumption good, c (a numeraire) – subject to a series of constraints:  
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where β is a discount factor. The housing consumption at a given future time period i, ht+i, is a weighted 
average housing consumption between owning with the propensity to own, τ, and renting with probability (1- 
τ), i.e., 
r
it
o
itit hhh   )1(  .
1 The optimization is subject to three constraints. First, the budget 
constraint (equation (2)) consists of three arguments – consumption (, housing rent (R, per-period per-unit 
rental price of housing service, multiplied by quantity of housing service, h), and saving, s, which should 
                                            
1 τ is a latent variable, which is proxied as one if a household owns in empirical study on the tenure choice. 
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equate labor income (yt+i = lt+i∙wt+i with l and w being labor supply and market wage), and return from 
accumulated wealth from both housing and non-housing assets (
n
it
h
it
j
it WWW   , j = h, n).      
Assuming no leverage (at this point), the housing wealth is equivalent to per-unit asset price of housing, Ph, 
multiplied by its quantity, it
h
it
h
it hPW   . Second, the tenure decision is influenced by borrowing 
constraints (equation (2)): that is, given optimal housing demand, h*, the optimal leverage amount M*; and, 
M* should be less than or equal the maximum loan amount, Mmax, set by three particular borrowing 
constraints (BC) – a maximum collateral rate (or a maximum loan-to-value, LTV, ratio), ,LTVitBC  a 
maximum debt (or mortgage) payment to income ratio (or per-period debt payment-to-income, DTI, ratio), 
DTI
itBC  , and a ceiling set by the risk appetite of mortgage lenders, it , a vector of mortgage underwriting 
criteria (other than the LTV and DTI limits) such as mortgage products offered, consumer credit ratings, and 
documentation requirements to verify income, wealth, and employment.2 Third, there is a labor supply 
constraint (equation (4)) such that, upon reaching at retirement age, T
~
, the labor supply (and, hence, the 
wage income) becomes zero and the consumer will have to be dependent upon other income sources (e.g., 
public and private pensions, or self-financing out of accumulated wealth).  
 
Empirical findings  
 
The usual determinants of housing demand include housing price (either asset price or user cost of capital for 
owning), household income (usually a permanent, rather than transient, income), and a series of demographic 
variables (e.g.,  household head’s personal attributes such as age, birth-year, marital status, and education 
level, as well as family size).  
 
(5) ),,,/( iiiiii BCDIPRf ,  
 
First, the specification of the demographic factor is rather ad hoc with different studies adopting different 
sets of explanatory variables. Two particular sets of the demographic variables employed are worth noting: 
namely, birth-year cohorts of household heads, under the premise that, depending on what age group each 
household head was in different stages of housing price boom-bust cycle in each country, accumulated 
housing wealth in later year can differ across the cohorts (Ohtake and Shintani (1994), Pitkin and Myers 
(1996), Sinai and Souleles (2008), Lindenthal and Eicholtz (2010), and Lee and Kim (2013)); and, human 
capital factors such as educational levels, which can influence permanent income of household heads 
(Hendershott and Green (1996), and Lindenthal and Eicholtz (2010)). 3  In pursuing an empirical 
                                            
22 It is well-documented in the recent literature that these leverage constraints tend to be pro-cyclical, i.e., being relaxed 
in an ebullient stage of housing market cycle but becoming more stringent in a crisis stage. 
3 In particular, Lindenthal and Eicholtz employed a four-step procedure: (1) estimating a hedonic model to capture 
implicit price of each property characteristic (i.e., an implicit price of ith property characteristic, pi, estimated from P = 
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investigation of effects of demographic factors, one should carefully consider various interactive terms 
between D and other key variables included (e.g., P*D in the case of birth-year cohorts and I*D in the case 
of education levels).4 
 
Second, Voigtlander (2009) investigated the reason why Germany homeownership rate is not high compared 
to other countries. The relatively low homeownership in Germany is caused by large rental market size, no 
benefits from owning, less interventions in rents, and stable housing price over a long period. Andrews and 
Sanchez (2011) studied homeownership rate in some OECD countries, based on household level micro data. 
The datasets consist of micro data and aggregate data: Age, household size, income, education level (micro 
data), LTV ratio, tax relief, and rent regulation (aggregate data). It is suggested that homeownership rate is 
increased with age, especially high in 45-64, positively related with household size, disposable income at a 
diminishing rate. The household with higher education level is more likely to be homeowner but not always 
significant. And the homeownership rate is generally lower for immigrant. In aspect of policy, the 
homeownership is increased with higher LTV ratio and decreased with stricter rent regulation. And tax relief 
indirectly crowd-out financially constrained household from homeownership.  
 
Third, tenure choice of household is largely omitted, or inadequately reflected, in the housing demand 
studies, even though there exists a large number of studies on this topic (Linneman and Wachter (1989), 
Linneman et al. (1998), Gyourko et al. (1999), Dieleman et al. (2003), Gabriel and Rosenthal (2005), 
Dawkins (2005), and Boehm and Scholttman (2009)). To control the tenure-related difference (in terms of 
housing expenditure), Mankiw and Weil converted the monthly rents for renters by simply multiplying them 
by 100. Obviously, one can adopt a more refined control of the tenure-driven difference, either by using a 
user cost variable or by incorporating a selectivity control factor (e.g., the inverse Mills ratio) in the demand 
equation. The tenure-driven differences can also be country-specific in that market conditions and 
institutional attributes tend to differ across countries (e.g., the Chonsei system in Korea). It has long been 
documented by the above studies that various constraints in borrowing, e.g., caps on loan-to-value (LTV) 
and debt-to-income (DTI) ratios, influence the propensity to own.   
 
                                                                                                                                    
g(Z) where Z is a set of property characteristics); (2) estimating the implicit price equation as a function of income and 
demographic characteristics, pi = h(zi, A, Y, X) where A and X are age and other demographic characteristics); (3) 
fitting an income dynamic equation as Y = k(A, A*E) where E represents education level; and, (4) aggregating total 
housing demand at a given time point as  where wa represents weight for a-th age group (up to 14). 
4 In the U.S., the effects of race on housing demand were investigated by a number of studies (de Leeuw (1971) , 
Carliner (1973), Lee and Trost (1978), Rosen (1979), Ihlanfeldt (1981), Boehm (1982), Goodman and Kawai (1982), 
Ihlanfeldt (1982), Dynarski (1985), Henderson and Ioannides (1989), and Cooperstein (1989). See Megbolugbe and 
Cho for a survey of the early studies on this topic.  
 8 
 
More on the borrowing constraints 
 
There has been a burgeoning literature on tenure choice, consumer’s selection between owning vs. renting 
for residence need, since the late 1980s. As one of forerunners in this area, Linneman and Wachter (1989) 
demonstrate that the households’ tenure choice is influenced by permanent income, relative cost (i.e., user 
cost of capital for owning), demographic variables (marital status, size of household, and so on), as well as 
borrowing constraints (both wealth and income constraints in purchasing or refinancing home mortgage). 
Subsequent studies use a similar model to further investigate effects of various socio-economic factors on 
the ownership decisions (Gyourko et al. (1999), Linneman et al. (1998), Megbolugbe and Cho (1996), 
Goodman and Kawai (1988)).  
 
There are two strands of micro studies from the above first-generation literature. First, a series of studies 
attempt to explain observed gap in owning propensity between racial groups. (Gabriel and Rosenthal (2005), 
Dawkins (2005), and Gyourko et al (1999)) For example, Gyourko et al. report that substantial differences in 
homeownership rates among racial groups (white vs. African American in particular) are explained by the 
differences in proportions of wealth-constrained households and in locations of residence (central cities vs. 
suburbs in particular); Gabriel and Rosenthal provide the evidence that household characteristics, rather than 
borrowing constraints, are dominant factors producing the ownership gaps, and suggest that improving 
financing options would be less likely to be effective in eliminating the gap; Dawkins finds that location 
characteristics associated with the supply of affordable owner-occupied housing directly affect the racial 
gaps in owning.     
 
Second, a number of studies further investigate tenure transition patterns of different consumer cohorts, e.g., 
from renting to first-time owning, from owning back to renting, from owning low-quality housing to 
high-quality (i.e., filtering up), and so on. (Boehm and Scholttman (2009) and (2004)), and Dieleman, Clark, 
and Dierlou (2003) and (1995)) Dieleman et al. (1995), one of the first in this line of research, provide the 
evidence that age, family status (marital and presence of children), income, and employment status impact 
transition probabilities of returning to rental tenure and, subsequently, their likelihood of becoming 
homeowners again; Boehm and Scholttman (2009) and (2004) provide further evidences, by using a more 
sophisticated econometric model along with two eleven year longitudinal compilations of households from 
Panel Study if Income Dynamics, that the observed differences in tenure transition probabilities between 
white vs. non-white households largely disappears once controlling gaps in education, income, net worth 
and savings. 
 
Linneman et al (1997) also studied the impact of borrowing constraints with micro-simulation estimates. 
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Besides the income and wealth constraints, market variables such as income, household head age, race, 
marital status, and family size are used. It has similar conclusion with previous study that wealth constraint 
has a bigger impact on homeownership. The simulation analysis shows the effect of changing wealth 
constraint is nonlinear and larger at higher LTV level and income ratio. Min et al (2012) did empirical study 
about the impact of borrowing constraint, specifically in Korea. By using household level micro data with 
variables of housing price-rental deposit ratio, income, age of household age, and family size, it has a 
conclusion that income or/and wealth constrained household shows lower tendency of owning and wealth 
constraint has a stronger impact on homeownership as same as previous studies. In terms of policy 
simulation, relaxing the LTV ratio will increase more the probability of owning than easing income 
constraint.  
 
Bourassa and Yin (2006) researched tenure choice differences between U.S.A and Australia, focusing on 
subsidy policies. The variables are housing cost, household characteristics, and subsidy. The result is that the 
former two variables do not explain differences in homeownership rates. On the other hand, subsidy policies 
have only a minor impact. Bourassa et al (2013) did research the impact of mortgage interest deduction on 
the homeownership. It quantifies the effect of mortgage interest deduction and imputed rent taxation and 
uses relative cost of owning and renting, borrowing constraints, real income, and tastes as variables. It 
concluded that mortgage interest deduction generally does not improve the homeownership rate as it is 
capitalized into housing price, especially when supply is inelastic. Hilber and Turner (2010) also studied the 
impact of mortgage interest deduction on homeownership rate. It also quantifies mortgage subsidy rate, 
value of regulation, household characteristics, location characteristics, and individual fixed effects. And the 
conclusion is that when average regulation is restrictiveness the mortgage interest deduction does not have 
effect, but it has positive effect with relaxed land use control. Furthermore, it has negative effect in more 
tightly constrained locations and no impact on low income.  
 
What this study aims to contribute  
 
Korea represents an interesting case to study the role of borrowing constraints in that its residential mortgage 
market has been evolving rapidly since the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s, and that the sector is 
heavily regulated with both LTV and DTI caps as well as the geographically-driven regulatory controls as 
well (“speculative zones” in which more restrictive lending limits are applied). Hence, we provide empirical 
evidences from the emerging market economy with an expanding mortgage lending sector with a series of 
lending restrictions.       
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3. Empirical Analyses 
 
Data and Variables 
 
The main data source used is the Korea Housing Survey for three years - 2006, 2010, and 2014, the bi-annual 
survey on housing characteristics published by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. The home 
price indexes and average mortgage rates are from Korea Appraisal Board; And all monetary values are 
translated to the real values as of the end of 2006 based on the consumer price indices (CPI) published by 
Bank of Korea. The list of all the variables used along with description of each is in Table 1; And summary 
statistics thereof are in Table 2.  
 
[Table 1: Variable Description] 
 
[Table 2: Summary statistics]  
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Empirical model and design  
 
Following the estimation procedure by the existing literature, two prior steps before estimating the tenure 
choice equation (5) are done. First, the permanent income equation is estimated based on the specification 
below.  
 
 
 
Current income can be biased as it can include a transient component in individuals’ earning, and the home 
purchase ability is likely to be correlated with life-long potential income. To estimate ‘e_ln_h_inc’ the 
natural log of household income is regressed on family size, house head age and square of age, natural log of 
net house wealth, region, degree of education, sort of occupation, type of jobs, and sex of house head, out of 
which we calculated the natural log of permanent house income, ‘ ’.  
 
Next, the borrowing constraint variables (BC) are constructed, for which the optimal home value (HV*) is 
estimated to discern constrained vs. unconstrained households. Specifically, the steps taken are as follows. 
First, the income and wealth constraints variables are built based on the formula below:   
 
               and   
 
  = front end ratio (marginal debt payment to income)  
   = mortgage (interest) rate   
 = LTV ratio   
  = current income   
 = current net wealth   
 
Second, a sub-sample of households is created such that their observed home values are less than the 
maximum values given the two borrowing constraints defined above - the wealth and income constraints.  
 
 
where,  min (  , ) 
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Third, we estimate the  equation based on the subsample with those who are not constrained by BC, by 
regressing the log of home price to the log of permanent income, age of house head, family size, degree of 
education, sex of house head, type of house, region, occupation of house head, job type of house head, and 
comparative ratio of ownership cost to rent, . The estimation results of the HV equation 
are shown in Table 4.  
 
 
 
Fourth, we calculated the optimal home value  that meets the needs of individual family characteristics 
assuming they don’t have financing constraints. , where,  is a set of explanatory 
variables,  is a vector of regressions, and  is random disturbance. The regression is based on households 
that has no borrowing constraints. ( ).   
 
Finally, the degrees of income and wealth constraint variables (  and ) for all households are defined 
as the following three levels – highly constrained (3), moderately constrained (2), and unconstrained (1).  
 
              )   and   ) 
 
Degree of 
income constraint 
(degree_gap_i) 
 
highly constrained =3 
 
moderately constrained=2 
 
unconstrained =1 
Degree of 
wealth constraint 
(degree_gap_w) 
 
highly constrained =3 
 
moderately constrained =2 
 
unconstrained =1 
 
 
Estimation results  
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The tenure choice equation of the following probit model is estimated, and various different model 
specifications are tested whose results are reported in Appendix (Table A.1 and A.2).  
 
(6)  
 
 : set of variables  
 : degree of income constraint  
 : degree of wealth constraint  
(1= unconstrained, 2= moderately constrained 3= highly constrained) 
 
Out of those specification tests, the five model outcomes are shown in Table 6 below as the main results: 
Model (1) with all the control variables along with two time dummies (one for year 2010, another for year 
2016, and 2006 data being the reference group) but without the borrowing constraint variables; Model (2) 
with all the controls plus both income-constraint and wealth-constraint variables but without time dummies; 
Model (3) with all the variables in the second model plus the two time dummies; Model (4) the model with 
the income-constraint and wealth-constraint variables interacted with the age group cohorts and without the 
income variable; and, Model (5) with the income-constraint and wealth-constraint variables interacted with 
the year cohorts.   
 
 
Table 6. The main estimation results 
(Dependent variable: Tenure status, one if owning;  
Pooled sample estimation with 2006, 2010, and 2016 surveys)  
 
VARIABLES 
Model 
(1) 
Model  
(2) 
Model  
(3) 
Model  
(4) 
Model  
(5) 
      
      
e_ln_h_inc 0.544*** 0.129*** 0.141***  0.117*** 
 (0.0167) (0.0353) (0.0241)  (0.0241) 
own_to_rent -0.131*** -0.136*** -0.115*** -0.0881*** -0.111*** 
 (0.00820) (0.0254) (0.00901) (0.00676) (0.00915) 
f_size 0.0237*** 0.135*** 0.148*** 0.0455*** 0.152*** 
 (0.00599) (0.0106) (0.00714) (0.00423) (0.00713) 
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Age  0.0465*** 0.0443***  0.0436*** 
  (0.00110) (0.000722)  (0.000712) 
2.sex  -0.143*** -0.152*** -0.192*** -0.160*** 
  (0.0324) (0.0223) (0.0133) (0.0225) 
2.h_type -1.590*** -0.849*** -0.866*** -1.056*** -0.895*** 
 (0.0228) (0.0420) (0.0265) (0.0166) (0.0261) 
3.h_type -1.064*** -0.282*** -0.479*** -0.772*** -0.512*** 
 (0.0321) (0.0552) (0.0366) (0.0262) (0.0360) 
4.h_type -0.589*** -0.00649 -0.127*** -0.384*** -0.140*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0305) (0.0219) (0.0137) (0.0221) 
5.h_type -0.648*** -0.217*** -0.313*** -0.438*** -0.324*** 
 (0.0295) (0.0482) (0.0322) (0.0236) (0.0323) 
6.h_type -0.798*** -0.226*** -0.356*** -0.585*** -0.367*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0463) (0.0292) (0.0209) (0.0295) 
7.h_type -1.107*** -0.576*** -0.569*** -0.815*** -0.595*** 
 (0.0571) (0.101) (0.0656) (0.0486) (0.0659) 
8.h_type -1.749*** -0.699*** -0.923*** -1.499*** -0.959*** 
 (0.0866) (0.156) (0.105) (0.0809) (0.103) 
9.h_type -1.344*** -1.009*** -1.340*** -1.403*** -1.320*** 
 (0.192) (0.333) (0.238) (0.131) (0.235) 
10.h_type -1.361*** -1.091*** -1.182*** -1.415*** -1.183*** 
 (0.183) (0.301) (0.197) (0.141) (0.195) 
2.degree_gap_i  -0.174*** -0.127***   
  (0.0342) (0.0232)   
3.degree_gap_i  -0.192*** -0.0868***   
  (0.0404) (0.0252)   
2.degree_gap_w  -0.999*** -0.843***   
  (0.0401) (0.0236)   
3.degree_gap_w  -1.810*** -1.711***   
  (0.0378) (0.0234)   
10.year -0.315***  -0.338*** -0.361***  
 (0.0138)  (0.0159) (0.0116)  
14.year -0.218***  -0.412*** -0.237***  
 (0.0160)  (0.0190) (0.0132)  
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1.y6_degree_gap_w     - 
      
2.y6_degree_gap_w     -0.648*** 
     (0.0342) 
3.y6_degree_gap_w     -1.481*** 
     (0.0312) 
1.y10_degree_gap_w     -0.232*** 
     (0.0175) 
2.y10_degree_gap_w     -1.263*** 
     (0.0398) 
3.y10_degree_gap_w     -2.090*** 
     (0.0340) 
1.y14_degree_gap_w     -0.277*** 
     (0.0201) 
2.y14_degree_gap_w     -1.263*** 
     (0.0539) 
3.y14_degree_gap_w     -2.340*** 
     (0.0522) 
Young -0.851***     
 (0.0135)     
1.old_gap_w    -  
      
2.old_gap_w    -0.980***  
    (0.0271)  
3.old_gap_w    -0.794***  
    (0.0119)  
1.young_gap_w    -0.814***  
    (0.0164)  
2.young_gap_w    -1.601***  
    (0.0368)  
3.young_gap_w    -2.108***  
    (0.0232)  
Constant -1.545*** -2.455*** -2.081*** 1.530*** -2.013*** 
 (0.0739) (0.205) (0.137) (0.0214) (0.136) 
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Observations 56,516 24,078 56,516 83,405 56,516 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
All the usual determinants of the propensity own show the expected signs that are statistically significant: 
that is, as shown in Table 6, the higher the permanent income, the larger the family size, the older the age 
cohort, the propensity to own gets higher; on the other hand, the higher user cost (or relative cost of owning), 
the lower the propensity becomes; and, contrary to our expectation, the two latter year cohorts (2010 and 
2016) show the lower propensities own compared to the 2006 cohort, which is consistent in all three models 
(Models 1, 3, and 4). As a possible reason for the last result, we conjecture that, although the mortgage 
market expanded during our study period (which should lower the user cost for average consumer), the 
market-wide lending restrictions through LTV-DTI caps along with the location-driven regulations 
(“speculative zones”) might have lowered the propensity over time.    
 
As expected, the borrowing constraint variables all show to reduce the propensity to own: compared to the 
unconstrained households (‘1.degree_gap_w’ for the wealth constraint, the reference group), both the 
moderately- and highly-constrained households exhibit the lower propensities (in Model (2), -0.999 for 
‘2.degree_gap_w’ and -1.81 for ‘3.degree_gap_w’ for the wealth-constrained households, and -0.174 for 
‘2.degree_gap_i’ and -0.192 for ‘3.degree_gap_i’ for the income-constrained households. Similar results are 
obtained from Model (3), indicating that the results are robust. As indicated by the coefficients, the 
magnitudes of the wealth effects are far larger than those of income constrains.  
 
When interacted with the age cohorts, it is also shown that the wealth constraints have a larger impact on the 
young borrowers. That is, in Model (4), the variable ‘1.old_gap_w’ is a combination of ‘old cohort’ with 
‘1.degree_gap_w’ (or unconstrained borrowers) is the reference group used; The impacts of wealth constraint 
in young cohort at all three constraint levels, [-0.814, -1.601, -2.108[, are shown to be higher than those of 
old cohort, [0, -0.980, -0.794] , based on which we conclude that the wealth constraints tend to make 
different effects for consumer cohorts with different lifecycle stages, and that they tend to play as a larger 
binding constraint for young households in their tenure decisions. One result to note is that, for old age 
cohorts, the mild wealth constraint in fact inflicts a bigger negative impact (the coefficient -0.980) than that 
of the high constrained (the coefficient -0.794), which may imply that older-age borrowers tend to have a 
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relatively more extensive social or business network that can mitigate the borrowing constraint. Conceptually, 
the wealth constraint should be less binding as the net wealth increases, which out data confirms: that is, 
while the average net worth of the old age cohorts amounts to 181 thousand KRW, that of the young cohorts 
is only 92 thousand KRW.  
 
Finally, when interacted with the survey years, it is shown that the impact of wealth constraint become larger 
in 2010 than 2006 compared to the base year of 2006 (1.y6_degree_gap_w in Model (5)). Specifically, the 
coefficient for ‘year10x1.degree_gap_w’ is -0.232, implying that those households with no wealth constraint 
have the lower propensity to own in 2010 compared to 2006; Between the two latter years, the sizes of 
impact are similar, [-0.232, -1.263, -2.090] for 2010 vs. [-0.277, -1.263, -2.340] for 2014; As expected, the 
more constrained, the higher the reduction in the propensity, [-0.648] for the moderately-constrained 
(2.y6_degree_gap_w) but [-1.481] for the highly-constrained (3.y6_degree_gap_w). In sum, our results 
indicate that there is no statistically valid evidence on the lowering impacts of the borrowing constraints as 
the residential mortgage market expands, as in the case of Korea during our study period. 
 
 
4. Policy implication: On the optimal LTV level   
 
Using our empirical results, we examine the causal relationship between the wealth constraint and the 
income constraint to come up with the optimal LTV constraint, by exploiting the fact that the two constraints 
are correlated through the following relationships:  
 
 min (  , ) 
      and      
 
Maximize  = Maximize [min (  , )] 
 
Based on the summary statistics from our testing sample (for mortgage interest rate, household income and 
wealth, and mortgage payment amount), the optimal levels computed are 0.83 and 0.71 for young- and 
old-cohort respectively (when the mortgage interest rate is 2.5 percent), which go down to 0.68 and 0.51 
when the interest rate increases to 6.5 percent. We plan to perform further analysis on this topic through 
future research.  
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Figure 3. Determining the optimal LTV level 
 
 
 
 
  young old 
 
average(i) 0.0523 0.0488 
 
average(mdpr) 0.35 0.35 
 
average(Inc) 275.06 268.44 
 
average(wealth) 9246.65 18091.02 
 
  
  
 @2.5% LTV* = 1/[1+(i/mdpr) *(W0/Y0)] 0.83 0.71 
  V* = W0 +(mdpr/I)*Y0  13097 21849 
 @6.0% LTV* = 1/[1+(i/mdpr) *(W0/Y0)] 0.68 0.51 
  V* = W0 +(mdpr/I)*Y0  10851 19657 
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5. Concluding remarks    
 
To our knowledge, this study offers the first-ever empirical evidence obtained from a micro household-level 
data on the effects of borrowing constraints on the tenure decision. Our results indicate that: the lending 
restrictions exhibit negative effects on the propensity to own, which are also shown to increase for younger 
borrower cohorts. In addition, despite the fact that the residential mortgage lending sector of the country 
experienced a substantial growth during our study period (2006 to 2014), the effects of the wealth constraints 
are shown to increase over time, particularly for the younger borrowers. Although we conjecture that the 
more binding lending restrictions combined with the location-based regulatory controls in the country would 
a possible cause, a further theoretical and empirical investigation is warranted for this outcome as well as 
other related consumer behavior such as the optimal mortgage (or LTV) demand for different consumer 
cohorts.   
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Table 1. Variable Description   
 
Variable definition 
Ownership Binomial variable (home owner=1, rent = 0)  
e_ln_h_inc Estimated log of permanent income  
own_to_rent Ratio of owner’s cost to rent cost (calculated based on individual 
region and year)  
f_size Family size of household  
Age Age of house head  
sex Sex of house head 
degree_gap_i Degree of income constraint (unconstrained =0, moderately 
constrained =1, highly constrained =2)  
degree_gap_w Degree of wealth constraint (unconstrained =0, moderately 
constrained =1, highly constrained =2)  
year_degree_gap_w Combined variable = ‘year’ X ‘degree_gap_w’   
h_type House type  
year Year of survey (2006, 2010, 2014)  
young Young cohort (house head under 40 years old =1)  
young_gap_w Combined variable = ‘young’ X ‘degree_gap_w’ 
old Old cohort (house head over 40 years old =1) 
old_gap_w Combined variable = ‘old’ X ‘degree_gap_w’ 
ln_h_price Log of house price  
region Region of household (17 regions at city and province level) 
education Degree of education (elementary=1, middle=2, high=3, over 
university degree=4) 
job_type Type of employment status  
occu Occupation of house head  
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Table 2. Summary statistics   
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Min Max 
      
1.ownership 83406 0.592919 0.4912931 0 1 
      
h_type      
2 83406 0.1534062 0.3603808 0 1 
3 83406 0.0362924 0.1870177 0 1 
4 83406 0.4439249 0.4968486 0 1 
5 83406 0.0532815 0.2245957 0 1 
6 83406 0.0731122 0.2603222 0 1 
7 83406 0.0090281 0.0945871 0 1 
8 83406 0.0074815 0.0861719 0 1 
9 83406 0.0016546 0.0406428 0 1 
10 83406 0.0015946 0.0399009 0 1 
      
ln_h_price 48539 9.268668 1.042125 2.995732 12.9088 
      
e_ln_h_inc 56516 5.466616 0.5123307 2.87508 7.143465 
      
Year      
10 83406 0.395655 0.4889939 0 1 
14 83406 0.2422488 0.4284466 0 1 
      
Region      
2 83406 0.0661943 0.2486229 0 1 
3 83406 0.0543006 0.2266114 0 1 
4 83406 0.0582692 0.2342532 0 1 
5 83406 0.0409563 0.1981902 0 1 
6 83406 0.0420473 0.2006984 0 1 
7 83406 0.0337506 0.1805875 0 1 
8 83406 0.0038367 0.0618222 0 1 
9 83406 0.1758027 0.3806545 0 1 
10 83406 0.0414958 0.1994352 0 1 
 23 
 
11 83406 0.0395655 0.1949372 0 1 
12 83406 0.0460758 0.2096506 0 1 
13 83406 0.0452725 0.2079025 0 1 
14 83406 0.0478862 0.2135268 0 1 
15 83406 0.0488094 0.2154707 0 1 
16 83406 0.0477064 0.2131456 0 1 
17 83406 0.0238232 0.152499 0 1 
      
owncost_area 48098 7.736621 8.293819 0 184.8678 
      
rent_area 22573 7.203583 8.090777 0.0139615 210.0214 
      
f_size 83406 2.890416 1.331889 1 15 
      
Age 83366 53.37756 15.50594 1 102 
      
2.sex 83405 0.1949164 0.3961387 0 1 
      
ln_h_inc 78525 5.265641 0.8389927 0 9.98276 
      
ln_n_wealth 75793 8.914933 1.487328 0 15.6238 
      
Edu      
2 83252 0.1214866 0.3266938 0 1 
3 83252 0.3408447 0.4739961 0 1 
4 83252 0.3293374 0.4699755 0 1 
      
job_type      
2 69852 0.1277272 0.3337882 0 1 
3 69852 0.1701598 0.3757758 0 1 
4 69852 0.1331386 0.3397269 0 1 
5 69852 0.1180925 0.32272 0 1 
      
own_to_rent 83406 1.138625 0.7376799 0 2.872797 
      
 24 
 
Occu      
2 61952 0.1110699 0.3142212 0 1 
3 61952 0.1870642 0.3899662 0 1 
4 61952 0.1644822 0.3707155 0 1 
5 61952 0.0845332 0.278188 0 1 
6 61952 0.1128131 0.3163668 0 1 
7 61952 0.1217878 0.3270432 0 1 
8 61952 0.1680979 0.3739562 0 1 
9 61952 0.0090877 0.0948959 0 1 
      
Young 83406 0.2136537 0.4098876 0 1 
      
degree_gap_i      
2 83406 0.0747308 0.2629581 0 1 
3 83406 0.3350358 0.4720058 0 1 
      
degree_gap_w      
2 83406 0.0480781 0.2139325 0 1 
3 83406 0.4550752 0.4979807 0 1 
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Table 3. Permanent income estimation  
 
 
 
  
VARIABLES ln_h_inc 
  
f_size 0.0910*** 
 (0.00199) 
age 0.0381*** 
 (0.00137) 
age2 -0.000438*** 
 (1.39e-05) 
ln_wealth 0.174*** 
 (0.00211) 
2.region -0.0561*** 
 (0.00920) 
3.region -0.0954*** 
 (0.00961) 
4.region -0.0612*** 
 (0.00918) 
5.region -0.0352*** 
 (0.0107) 
6.region -0.0392*** 
 (0.0103) 
7.region 0.0695*** 
 (0.0109) 
8.region -0.117*** 
 (0.0347) 
9.region -0.0480*** 
 (0.00657) 
10.region -0.0233* 
 (0.0123) 
11.region 0.00462 
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 (0.0112) 
12.region -0.0231** 
 (0.0108) 
13.region -0.0588*** 
 (0.0122) 
14.region -0.0640*** 
 (0.0125) 
15.region -0.0642*** 
 (0.0106) 
16.region -0.0819*** 
 (0.0103) 
17.region 0.153*** 
 (0.0166) 
2.edu 0.170*** 
 (0.0108) 
3.edu 0.275*** 
 (0.0104) 
4.edu 0.403*** 
 (0.0114) 
2.occu -0.0506*** 
 (0.0114) 
3.occu -0.154*** 
 (0.0105) 
4.occu -0.176*** 
 (0.0112) 
5.occu -0.176*** 
 (0.0126) 
6.occu -0.535*** 
 (0.0153) 
7.occu -0.175*** 
 (0.0113) 
8.occu -0.219*** 
 (0.0117) 
9.occu -0.0441** 
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 (0.0197) 
2.job_type -0.136*** 
 (0.00756) 
3.job_type 0.0285*** 
 (0.00713) 
4.job_type 0.0803*** 
 (0.00742) 
5.job_type 0.00341 
 (0.0360) 
2.sex -0.142*** 
 (0.00762) 
Constant 2.834*** 
 (0.0355) 
  
Observations 56,273 
R-squared 0.533 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. Estimation of the optimal housing price equation ( )  
 
 
 
     estimate ‘ ’ based on households with no borrowing constrained  
 
  
VARIABLES ln_h_price 
  
e_ln_h_inc 2.262*** 
 (0.0240) 
age 0.0206*** 
 (0.000361) 
f_size -0.169*** 
 (0.00400) 
2.edu -0.383*** 
 (0.0155) 
3.edu -0.536*** 
 (0.0163) 
4.edu -0.642*** 
 (0.0198) 
2.sex 0.325*** 
 (0.0127) 
2.h_type 0.416*** 
 (0.0161) 
3.h_type 0.496*** 
 (0.0227) 
4.h_type 0.308*** 
 (0.0111) 
5.h_type -0.0874*** 
 (0.0144) 
6.h_type -0.0272** 
 (0.0139) 
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7.h_type 0.436*** 
 (0.0503) 
8.h_type 0.234*** 
 (0.0555) 
9.h_type -1.100** 
 (0.435) 
10.h_type -0.897*** 
 (0.306) 
2.region -0.365*** 
 (0.0117) 
3.region -0.262*** 
 (0.0125) 
4.region -0.225*** 
 (0.0119) 
5.region -0.609*** 
 (0.0140) 
6.region -0.394*** 
 (0.0135) 
7.region -0.678*** 
 (0.0136) 
8.region -0.0925* 
 (0.0537) 
9.region -0.184*** 
 (0.00959) 
10.region -0.743*** 
 (0.0193) 
11.region -0.755*** 
 (0.0183) 
12.region -0.681*** 
 (0.0181) 
13.region -0.819*** 
 (0.0183) 
14.region -0.771*** 
 (0.0184) 
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15.region -0.653*** 
 (0.0161) 
16.region -0.431*** 
 (0.0153) 
17.region -0.996*** 
 (0.0216) 
2.occu 0.0804*** 
 (0.0137) 
3.occu 0.285*** 
 (0.0134) 
4.occu 0.310*** 
 (0.0146) 
5.occu 0.322*** 
 (0.0161) 
6.occu 0.753*** 
 (0.0250) 
7.occu 0.284*** 
 (0.0147) 
8.occu 0.379*** 
 (0.0157) 
9.occu 0.0624* 
 (0.0378) 
2.job_type 0.299*** 
 (0.0115) 
3.job_type -0.121*** 
 (0.00877) 
4.job_type -0.0908*** 
 (0.0102) 
5.job_type 0.128*** 
 (0.0465) 
own_to_rent -0.0480*** 
 (0.00374) 
Constant -3.375*** 
 (0.132) 
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Observations 30,054 
R-squared 0.719 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix: Results of the specification tests  
 
Table A.1. Results of Panel Regression (1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ownership ownership ownership ownership 
     
e_ln_h_inc 1.082*** 0.141*** 0.130*** 0.117*** 
 (0.0206) (0.0241) (0.0242) (0.0241) 
own_to_rent -0.150*** -0.115*** -0.113*** -0.111*** 
 (0.00854) (0.00901) (0.00916) (0.00915) 
f_size 0.0160** 0.148*** 0.149*** 0.152*** 
 (0.00647) (0.00714) (0.00716) (0.00713) 
Age 0.0580*** 0.0443*** 0.0444*** 0.0436*** 
 (0.000662) (0.000722) (0.000725) (0.000712) 
2.sex -0.00539 -0.152*** -0.151*** -0.160*** 
 (0.0203) (0.0223) (0.0225) (0.0225) 
2.degree_gap_i  -0.127*** -0.138***  
  (0.0232) (0.0229)  
3.degree_gap_i  -0.0868*** -0.121***  
  (0.0252) (0.0248)  
2.degree_gap_w  -0.843*** -0.623***  
  (0.0236) (0.0344)  
3.degree_gap_w  -1.711*** -1.440***  
  (0.0234) (0.0320)  
1.y14_degree_gap_w   -0.307*** -0.277*** 
   (0.0207) (0.0201) 
2.y14_degree_gap_w   -0.666*** -1.263*** 
   (0.0616) (0.0539) 
3.y14_degree_gap_w   -0.920*** -2.340*** 
   (0.0570) (0.0522) 
1.y10_degree_gap_w   -0.245*** -0.232*** 
   (0.0177) (0.0175) 
2.y10_degree_gap_w   -0.634*** -1.263*** 
   (0.0490) (0.0398) 
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3.y10_degree_gap_w   -0.635*** -2.090*** 
   (0.0401) (0.0340) 
0o.y6_degree_gap_w   - - 
     
2o.y6_degree_gap_w   - -0.648*** 
    (0.0342) 
3o.y6_degree_gap_w   - -1.481*** 
    (0.0312) 
2.h_type -1.414*** -0.866*** -0.867*** -0.895*** 
 (0.0233) (0.0265) (0.0266) (0.0261) 
3.h_type -0.985*** -0.479*** -0.484*** -0.512*** 
 (0.0325) (0.0366) (0.0364) (0.0360) 
4.h_type -0.369*** -0.127*** -0.127*** -0.140*** 
 (0.0208) (0.0219) (0.0222) (0.0221) 
5.h_type -0.400*** -0.313*** -0.322*** -0.324*** 
 (0.0308) (0.0322) (0.0323) (0.0323) 
6.h_type -0.512*** -0.356*** -0.362*** -0.367*** 
 (0.0275) (0.0292) (0.0295) (0.0295) 
7.h_type -1.091*** -0.569*** -0.570*** -0.595*** 
 (0.0597) (0.0656) (0.0661) (0.0659) 
8.h_type -1.300*** -0.923*** -0.946*** -0.959*** 
 (0.0989) (0.105) (0.104) (0.103) 
9.h_type -1.177*** -1.340*** -1.329*** -1.320*** 
 (0.223) (0.238) (0.237) (0.235) 
10.h_type -1.083*** -1.182*** -1.186*** -1.183*** 
 (0.198) (0.197) (0.195) (0.195) 
10.year -0.361*** -0.338***   
 (0.0145) (0.0159)   
14.year -0.410*** -0.412***   
 (0.0170) (0.0190)   
Constant -7.605*** -2.081*** -2.092*** -2.013*** 
 (0.117) (0.137) (0.137) (0.136) 
     
Observations 56,516 56,516 56,516 56,516 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.2. Results of Panel Regression (2) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ownership ownership ownership ownership 
     
e_ln_h_inc    0.133*** 
    (0.0249) 
own_to_rent -0.0881*** -0.0674*** -0.0674*** -0.115*** 
 (0.00676) (0.00658) (0.00658) (0.00901) 
f_size 0.0455*** 0.0562*** 0.0562*** 0.147*** 
 (0.00423) (0.00419) (0.00419) (0.00715) 
age    0.0435*** 
    (0.00102) 
2.sex -0.192*** -0.193*** -0.193*** -0.155*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0224) 
2.degree_gap_i    -0.127*** 
    (0.0232) 
3.degree_gap_i    -0.0855*** 
    (0.0252) 
2.degree_gap_w    -0.844*** 
    (0.0236) 
3.degree_gap_w    -1.715*** 
    (0.0237) 
young    -0.0265 
    (0.0221) 
2.h_type -1.056*** -0.998*** -0.998*** -0.866*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0265) 
3.h_type -0.772*** -0.712*** -0.712*** -0.479*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0258) (0.0258) (0.0366) 
4.h_type -0.384*** -0.368*** -0.368*** -0.126*** 
 (0.0137) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0219) 
5.h_type -0.438*** -0.405*** -0.405*** -0.313*** 
 (0.0236) (0.0235) (0.0235) (0.0322) 
6.h_type -0.585*** -0.555*** -0.555*** -0.356*** 
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 (0.0209) (0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0292) 
7.h_type -0.815*** -0.789*** -0.789*** -0.568*** 
 (0.0486) (0.0483) (0.0483) (0.0656) 
8.h_type -1.499*** -1.471*** -1.471*** -0.921*** 
 (0.0809) (0.0807) (0.0807) (0.105) 
9.h_type -1.403*** -1.359*** -1.359*** -1.341*** 
 (0.131) (0.126) (0.126) (0.238) 
10.h_type -1.415*** -1.348*** -1.348*** -1.183*** 
 (0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.197) 
10.year -0.361***   -0.339*** 
 (0.0116)   (0.0159) 
14.year -0.237***   -0.412*** 
 (0.0132)   (0.0190) 
1.young_gap_w -0.814*** -0.778*** -0.778***  
 (0.0164) (0.0161) (0.0161)  
2.young_gap_w -1.601*** -1.521*** -1.521***  
 (0.0368) (0.0365) (0.0365)  
3.young_gap_w -2.108*** -2.036*** -2.036***  
 (0.0232) (0.0230) (0.0230)  
0o.old_gap_w - - -  
     
2.old_gap_w -0.980*** -0.945*** -0.945***  
 (0.0271) (0.0271) (0.0271)  
3.old_gap_w -0.794*** -0.755*** -0.755***  
 (0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0117)  
Constant 1.530*** 1.224*** 1.224*** -1.985*** 
 (0.0214) (0.0187) (0.0187) (0.158) 
     
Observations 83,405 83,405 83,405 56,516 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
